Single Question.

[Interpolation] “After what has been said [sc. I dd.1-21] it seems we must discourse of the diversity of the names, etc     .” [Lombard, Sent. I d.22 ch.1 n.198]. According to what the Apostle says Romans 10.10: “With the heart faith is held unto justice, but with the mouth confession is made unto salvation,” in accord with this the Master [Lombard] -proceeding in this first book -, after he has taught what is to be believed about God and divine reality [I dd.1-21], teaches in this second part [sc. from I d.22] how one should speak about what is believed. And that this division is according to his intention is plain to anyone who considers his text at the beginning of this distinction 22.Vatican editors give the text from Lombard thus: “After what has been said, it seems we must discourse of the diversity of the names we use in speaking of the ineffable Unity and Trinity. Next we must show in what ways something is said about that Unity and Trinity.” ⁹⁹

Now this part is divided into two: the preface [the opening text just referred to] and the treatise (which begins at ‘That then chiefly’ [from d.22 to the end of the first book of the Sentences]). And the treatise is divided into two: in the first of which he makes determination about the divine names in general, setting down differences of six names about God, and in the second of which he pursues these differences separately and singly (and this part begins ‘One needs to know therefore’ [ch.4 n.201]). And this second part is divided into two: in the first of which he gives determinations about names for which a shorter treatise is sufficient, and in the second about certain names that require a special and distinct treatise (the second part begins at the beginning of distinction 35: ‘Since we have discussed above’). The first is again divided into two: for in the first he gives determinations about absolute names [dd.22-25], in the second about relative names (at the beginning of distinction 26: ‘Now about the properties of the persons’). The first of these is divided into two: for first he lays down a rule about absolute names which makes apparent their distinction from relative names - second he excepts from the common rule the name ‘person’ (and this at the beginning of distinction 23: ‘To what has been said one must add’). The first is divided into two, because first he lays down the rule and proves it from Augustine, and second he adduces a proof from Augustine, with which he proves the conclusion asserted (the second part at the place ‘But God is not great etc.’).

[Interpolation]From Reportatio IA d.22 q. un. ¹⁰⁰ About this distinction I ask whether God is nameable by a human wayfarer with some proper name.

That he is not:

Augustine in sermon 34 ‘On the Lord’s Words’ [Sermon 117 ch.5 n.7]: “Whatever can be said is not ineffable; but God is ineffable.” The minor is proved by Augustine, by what he immediately subjoins when he says: “For if the Apostle Paul says that he was snatched up ‘to the third heaven and heard ineffable words’, how much more is he who shows him these ineffable things himself ineffable?”

Further, Augustine in homily 19 on John [On the Gospel of John, tract.19 n.1], when expounding the verse, John 5.19: “The Son can do nothing that he has not seen the Father doing,” says that “the seeing of the Son is the very being of the Word of the Father, which cannot be shown by words.”

Further, Hilary On the Trinity III ch.9 [n.20]: “The virtue of the generation [sc. of the Son] exceeds the speech of human nature.”

Further, Ambrose On the Trinity I ch.5 [On the Faith I ch.10 n.64]: “Voice is silent, not my own only, but also that of angels” (he is speaking of the generation of the Son).

Further, by reason: nothing can be signified by anyone save what can be understood by him as well; but God cannot be understood by the human wayfarer with a proper concept;     therefore etc     . - The major is proved by Aristotle (Metaphysics 4.4.1006a22-24) and the Commentator (Averroes, Metaphysics IV com.10), and is proved as to the issue at hand by Augustine On the Trinity VII ch.4 n.7 (“God is more truly thought on than named, and exists more truly than he may be thought”), and by the Philosopher On Interpretation 1.16a3-4 (“Words are signs of affections” that is of concepts): therefore there cannot be a sign of some remote signified thing save under the idea under which the concept is the proximate sign of it. The minor is proved by the saying of Exodus 33.20: “No man will see me and live;” and by reason, because the proper concept, if it were had, would include virtually a proper knowledge of all the things that are necessarily in God; the proof of this consequence is that, universally, the proper concept of a subject, even in creatures, virtually includes a proper knowledge of everything that is in the subject; and then would follow further that, just as he who has the proper concept of a subject can naturally know simply all that is knowable about the subject, so the wayfarer who has such a concept could naturally know all necessary truths about God, and consequently all that we have faith about, as to unity and trinity in divine reality and as to creative and incarnative power, and so about the other things necessarily belonging to God.

To the contrary:

In Psalm 75.2: “Great is my name in Israel;” and Exodus 3.14-15: “These things shalt thou say to the children of Israel: He who is sent me to you, this is my name     etc .”

Further, Augustine Against Adimantus ch.13 n.2: “That inestimable sublimity must, in order to be adapted to the ear, be signified by human signs.”

Further, by reason: the wayfarer can have a proper concept of God, therefore      he can also name him with a proper name. - The proof of the antecedent is that he can know by natural reason that some being is first and infinite, and that it is unique and a ‘this’; therefore he can have a concept of that essence as it is a ‘this’ (but such a concept seems to be most proper to any object, namely to conceive as it is a ‘this’, in itself).

Here is one opinion [Henry of Ghent], as follows:

A name or vocal word must be a symbol between the speaker and the spoken to, such that the signified thing be in itself known to each of them, and also that each know that the name is imposed to signify that thing; but the truth of the divine nature is known, as to the idea of its immensity, only to God; therefore only he can appropriate a proper name to himself. Now the opinion subjoins for the second minor (to be assumed under the first major) that the blessed know that essence in itself; therefore by some word (as a sign of that essence) under that idea they can name God, whether that word be instituted by God or by one of the blessed. The third minor is that the wayfarer cannot conceive the divine essence, neither as to the idea of its immensity (this is proper to God) nor in the same way that the blessed see it; and therefore a sign imposed on the essence in the first or second way cannot lead them to any knowledge of the divine essence, just as neither can someone born blind be led to a knowledge of colors by the words which those lead themselves by who see and know colors, through recollection, to a knowledge of colors. Fourth minor: the intellect of the wayfarer can in some way conceive God; therefore he can name him in a proportional way. - The opinion adds there that no name proper to God, imposed at will, can be transferred from creatures (because any such name is also common to creatures and is imposed on them first), but that that name must be first and principally imposed on him, up to the little extent that God can be known by creatures.

The inference is further drawn that this name ‘God’ signifies, from its imposition, what is simply more perfect, as if in sum and in general by comparison with other names which express as it were in particular fashion something that has the idea of dignity in God, as are ‘wise’, ‘good’     etc . Also this name ‘God’ is imposed on him first, such that it does not belong to creatures save by transference (the way Moses was called the ‘god of Pharaoh’, Exodus 7.1); therefore      of all Latin names the name proper to him is this name ‘God’, and proper in this way in the Greek tongue is the name ‘Theos’.

How the major in the reasoning of this opinion is true will be stated in the solution of the question. But the minors, or the diverse parts of the same minor, seem doubtful. The first indeed, namely that ‘only God knows himself under the idea of his immensity’, is, as to its affirmative part that ‘he thus knows himself’, most certain. But as to its negative part, namely that ‘no intellect knows God under that idea’, it is refuted as follows:

No operative power can be most perfectly at rest save in an object that includes the highest perfection possible for the adequate object of the power; but infinity or immensity is the perfection possible for being or truth, or for any transcendent idea, and one or other of them is the adequate object of any intellect; therefore a created intellect is not perfectly at rest save in God under the idea of his immensity. - The major is proved by an example from sight and from the visible object agreeable to it, and by reason, because, whenever anything else is had, the power still has an inclination to something not had and more principle than what is had. The first part of the minor was proved in distinction 2 [I d.2 n.147], the second part in distinction 3 [I d.3 n.137].

The second refutation is as follows: only an act of intellection that ‘comprehends God’ is repugnant to a created intellect; but some act of intellection of God ‘according to the idea of his immensity’ can exist that does not comprehend God;     therefore etc     . - The proof of the minor is that an act that comprehends an infinite object is infinite in intensity, because it is as perfect in idea of act as the object is perfect in idea of object, and so it is simply adequate; but there can be of an object as it is immense a non-infinite act, because, just as the object can be simply more perfect than the act, and this under the idea under which it is the object of the act, so it can also be infinite without infinity of act. A

confirmation is that there seems to be no reason why there could not be about an object ‘under the idea of infinity’ an act more perfect in one intellect and less perfect in another.

With this part of the minor refuted, the corresponding conclusion is refuted, - and first as follows:

Someone who names an object under some idea does not have to comprehend the object under that idea, but it is enough that he distinctly apprehend it; a created intellect can thus apprehend God under the idea of immensity (the thing is plain from the reasons already set down);     therefore , etc     . - The proof of the major is that Adam imposed names on diverse animals proper to them and yet he did not comprehend them, because then he would have known them with a perfection equal to that which the soul of Christ had, which is not maintained.

Second, because a natural sign is more truly a sign than one imposed at pleasure; a created act of intellection can be a natural sign of God as to the idea of his immensity; therefore someone so understanding can impose on God a sign at pleasure. - The proof of the minor is that intellection, as it is of the object, is a natural sign of it (Aristotle On Interpretation ibid. “Words are signs of affections” and this naturally so), which is for this reason, that intellection is the proper idea of the object; but it was proved before that some created intellection can be of God under the idea of his immensity.

Third, because any name is a finite sign, even if it be imposed by God himself according to the idea of his immensity; therefore, in order for it to be a sign for someone who understands, there is no need for that someone to have an infinite intellection of it. God can, then, be named with some name or other by a finite intelligence, nay more, God cannot name himself with any name that as much exceeds the name by which he is nameable by the blessed as the comprehension of God exceeds the apprehension of the blessed; and no wonder, because neither does there need to be for us a proportion of a name to a named thing when signifying it, just as neither a proportion of intellection to the intellection of the one who imposes or uses it, - and therefore a name imposed by one of them can be a sign for both of them. Thus therefore, this name imposed by God who comprehends can be a sign common to himself and the blessed, because it only signifies finitely, and so neither does it require in the user an infinite intellection.

The fourth part of the minor, although it be itself true when maintaining that the wayfarer could not have a proper quidditative concept of God, and although the blessed has imposed a name to signify the sort of proper concept that he has of God, yet there is argument that it is repugnant to what he [sc. Henry of Ghent] said elsewhere:

First as follows: for he concedes that the wayfarer has some quidditative concept of God, and plainly so because otherwise no one could have a qualitative or relative concept of God, for a qualitative concept always requires some quidditative one wherein it is; but according to him a quidditative concept of God cannot be had that is common to God and creatures; therefore it will be a proper concept and so simply primarily diverse from the concept of a creature. Therefore the name that is imposed on God under his proper idea would not be a name for the wayfarer just as neither is the name of color for one born blind. - If it be said that the wayfarer cannot intuitively understand God as the blessed can, this is not an obstacle, because an intuitive concept of the thing signified by the name is never given by the name, but only some recollection for considering a thing already known; the point is plain from the example, for a blind man not born blind, because he did once see colors, does very well use the name of color as a sign common to him and someone sighted, because both can understand colors by recollection, even though the blind man cannot now intuit colors.

The second argument is as follows: a perfect object can produce in a proportioned intellect some concept capable of being had about it (the proof of this is that a less perfect object can do this); but the divine essence - according to Henry - can only make in a proportioned intellect a single real concept (other concepts, if any are had, are had by the intellect busying itself about it); therefore the single real concept is the only one capable of being had about that essence. Therefore if he has some concept of God (he does have one!), it will be a proper concept. Nor is concept in this argument taken for the nature of conceiving, but for the formal object terminating the act. - Although the major of this argument seems probable, it may yet be denied of a proportioned intellect (that is an infinite one), because that intellect comprehends with a single concept, and so it is not capable of many concepts about the object in the way an intellect that does not comprehend is; the major may also be denied of any intellect at all, by understanding it of the immediate object that in itself moves the intellect, because, on account of its perfection, it would not move the intellect to imperfect concepts that can be had about itself through the motion of other objects that imperfectly move the intellect to knowledge of itself.

As to the question I set certain things down first:

First, that any name, signifying something that can be present in a particular thing alone, can be called the proper name of that thing, although simply the thing’s proper name is only what first signifies it under its proper idea, because only that name is the proper vocal sign of it.

Second I set down that ‘to be named by someone’ can be understood in two ways: either as a name for the imposer or as a name for the user; and each of these in two ways, that is, perfectly and imperfectly. Using a name perfectly is not only using the name as some natural vocal sound, namely by forming the sound (the way a trained bird can form it), but is to use the name ‘as a sign’ not only of a concept able to be got through that name by someone else (in this way a Latin speaker could pronounce some Hebrew word to a Hebrew without knowing what he was saying), but also as a sign of a concept possessed by the user, so that thus ‘to use a name perfectly’ is to use it as a sign expressive of a proper concept; but to use it as in some way the cause of the hearer’s having a like concept by recollection is not necessary for simply using it perfectly but for perfectly using it as a sign common to two people, and therefore this is required for perfectly using the name morally, because it is required for using the name for the due end. And both these perfections are touched on by Augustine Enchiridion ch.22 when he says: “Words are introduced so that by them someone may put forward his thoughts for the knowledge of another;” behold the first perfection ‘his thoughts’, - behold the second ‘for the knowledge of another’. Understand the ‘of another’ (or ‘as it were of another’) in that sometimes someone by speaking leads himself more effectively to knowledge by recollection than without speaking (to a knowledge then, I say, that is not new), as when we speak to God in prayer; again, as to the first perfection, I draw a distinction in ‘his thoughts’, because either he has a concept as proper as the name signifies it (and then he signifies ‘his thoughts’ perfectly), or he has a less proper or a confused concept, as for example when someone who has only the concept of animal puts forward this vocal sound ‘man’, intending to express to the hearer by this name what others conceive through the name and for which the name was imposed, while knowing that it was imposed on some species under animal but not understanding it with the particularity that the name signifies. The order then is as follows: to use the name as it is such and such a thing; next, to use it as a sign at pleasure of something else, of which however the user has no concept (save in this very universal way, that there is something signified by the name); third, as a sign of something of which the user has only a universal concept (yet he intends to express what is signified by the name, although he does not conceive it thus in particular); fourth, as a sign expressive of the proper concept in particular. And here a prior stage is always imperfect with respect to a later one; the first stage then is most imperfect, the last simply perfect.

Having laid down these premises, let the first conclusion with respect to the question be as follows: it is possible for God to be named by the wayfarer with a name that is simply proper according to the first three ways aforesaid; the second conclusion is this: it is not possible for God to be named perfectly by the wayfarer, namely according to the fourth stage; third conclusion: how God is in fact named by us.

The proof of the first is that, if it is not true, this would only be because one cannot have a proper concept of God, - and because the thing must be conceived the way it is named. But this second point is false: proof, because we have no concept that is per se and proper about any substance; if then it is impossible to name a thing more distinctly than one conceives it, the result is that the wayfarer does not, as user of the name, distinctly signify substance with any name, nor will any name imposed by the wayfarer signify any substance distinctly. The consequent is false, therefore the antecedent is too.

The first proposition, namely that ‘we do not understand substance distinctly’ was proved above in distinction 3 [I d.3 n.140].

As to how the opposite of the consequent is true (because it is a preamble to the proposed solution), this is made clear first by the denomination of substance, by using the imposed name, - second, by the denomination of it when imposing on it a name.

The first as follows:

By this name ‘man’ we do not intend to signify animal merely (as is plain), but something under animal distinct from horse and other animals; hence this proposition is true for us, ‘man is per se distinct from horse’ etc. Nor do we intend to signify by the name ‘man’ some accident or accidents, but the species in the genus of substance only; hence this proposition is true ‘man is per se distinct from any accident whatever’, even by the greatest distinctness because in accord with the most general of genera. Nor do we intend to signify some description made up of animal and an accident (or accidents), but rather something per se one and of a nature to have in itself a definitive concept that is per se one; but that which we intend to signify under its proper idea, although we do not so understand it, this we name imperfectly according to the third stage, as was said before;     therefore etc     .

The second, namely about imposition as about use, is similarly plain:

For just as, if Adam, when understanding man under its proper idea, imposed on it a name proper to it, which name, when I use it, I intend to signify the thing the way its name was imposed on it (about which, however, I do not have a concept save an imperfect one in general, or accidentally, or in some description), so I, if I were likewise to understand the same thing when it was not yet named, could impose a name on it, intending by that name to signify it in just the way I intend now to signify it with a name already imposed by another. And when someone imposes a name like this, although he do not have a concept of the thing save under some description, which is signified by the etymology of the name, yet the name is not imposed to signify that etymology or description, but the substance of which it is the description; just as this name ‘stone’ is not imposed to signify this action ‘striking the bone of the foot’ (because then stone would be in the genus of action per se), but it is imposed on the substance under its proper idea, of which substance this is a sort of description ‘striking the bone of the foot’. This point is also plain, because sometimes many names are imposed on the same thing, not from the same property but from different ones, as stone-rock; nor are the names imposed on the properties, because then they would not be names of the same thing per se, nay one would be a name of something in the genus of action and the other of something in the genus of passion (as ‘rounded down by being struck by the foot’).Tr. ‘Rounded down by being struck by the foot’ is an Englished version for the etymology of ‘rock’ mimicking the Latin ‘pede trita’ (‘worn down by the foot’), given by Scotus, for the Latin ‘petra’ (‘rock’). ¹⁰¹

It is plain, then, that the reason for the imposition of a name is one thing (and it is what the etymology signifies) and what it is imposed on is another; and so although the one imposing it did not have a distinct concept save of the reason for which he imposed the name, yet he did not impose the name on that reason but on the substance of which the reason is the description, and on the substance under its proper idea, which however he does not thus understand, - and consequently he names it as imposing the name imperfectly in accord with the third stage.